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FTC V. WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS
677 F.3D 1298 (11TH CIR. 2012)
I. INTRODUCTION
FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals is an appeal from a ruling by
the Northern District Court of Georgia dismissing the Federal
Trade Commission's (FTC) lawsuit for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).' The FTC alleged in its amended
complaint that these reverse payment settlement agreements were
unlawful agreements not to compete in violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.2 The FTC argued that these reverse
payment agreements fell outside of the safe harbor of the Eleventh
Circuit's precedent because these agreements exceeded the
potential exclusionary scope of the patent.' Nevertheless, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit declined to
extend its rule to encompass a determination about the underlying
patent litigation and reaffirmed its past precedent that a reverse
payment settlement agreement will be valid if its anticompetitive
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent at issue; and that the determination of the extent of the
potential exclusionary scope of the patent shall be made at the time
the reverse payment settlement agreement was executed.
1. Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1306
(11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
2. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
3. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1306.
4. Id. at 1308, 1312.
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II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Risk-Reward Benefit ofPharmaceutical Development and
Reverse Payment Agreements
The Eleventh Circuit began with a discussion of the risks that a
pharmaceutical manufacturer undertakes when attempting to
develop a new drug. Only one in every 5,000 medicines tested is
ever approved for patient use, and according to some estimates,
developing a new drug can take anywhere between ten and fifteen
years and cost upwards of $1.3 billion dollars.' The court
summarized the drug development and approval process with the
maxim, "no risk, no reward and more risk, more reward."' Based
on these substantial risks, the court surmised that many patent-
holding companies are inclined to settle lawsuits "in order to
preserve their patents and keep monopoly profits flowing" as
opposed to "rolling the dice and risking their monopoly profits in
the infamously costly and notoriously unpredictable process of
patent litigation."'
Before addressing the opposing party's arguments, the court
noted that the type of settlement at issue here is known as a "pay
for delay" or a "reverse payment" agreement.' In a reverse
payment agreement, "a patent holder pays the allegedly infringing
generic drug company to delay entering the market until a
specified date, thereby protecting the patent monopoly against a
judgment that the patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the
generic competitor."'o
5. Id at 1300.
6. Id. (citing Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic
Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 367, 369 & n.10 (2010)).
7. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id at 1300-01.
9. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1301.
10. Id.
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B. The FTC's Arguments
The Federal Trade Commission brought this lawsuit against four
drug manufacturers: the patent holder, Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., and three generic manufacturers, Watson Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Paddock Laboratories, Inc., and Par Pharmaceutical
Companies, Inc." In its complaint, the FTC alleged that the
reverse payment settlements between the holder of the patent and
two generic manufacturers were unfair restraints on trade in
violation of the Sherman Act Section 45.12 Additionally, the FTC
claimed the reverse payments were tools manufacturers used to
ensure that a patent is not judged invalid or to avoid a ruling that
the generic manufacturers would not infringe a patent." The court
mentioned "the key allegation in the FTC's complaint [was] that
[Solvay Pharmaceuticals] was 'not likely to prevail' in the
infringement actions that it brought against the generic
manufacturers and then settled."l 4 The FTC complained, in its
view, the reverse payments unlawfully protected a monopoly and
should therefore not be protected from antitrust attack." Lastly,
the FTC asserted that generic drug companies are willing to settle
their lawsuits because the patent holder can continue to reap
monopoly profits that it will share with the generic manufacturer. 6
This monopoly profit sharing strategy will often lead to greater
profits than the individual profits the drug companies could make
by competing against each other." The FTC claimed this was a
"win-win" for the drug companies and it estimated that "reverse
11. Id. at 1305.
12. Id. at 1301.
13. Id.
14. Id. Specifically, the FTC alleged that the generic products "contained
ingredients that the patent did not cover, or amounts of ingredients outside the
amounts covered by the patent." See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Federal Trade
Commission at 38 FTC v. Watson Pharma., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)
(No. 10-12729), 2010 WL 5064779 at *38.
15. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1301.
16. Id.
17. Id.
2013] 493
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payment settlements cost consumers about $3.5 billion per year in
the form of higher drug prices."8
C. Drug Companies' Arguments
In defense of the alleged antitrust violation, the drug companies
contended that reverse payment settlements are simply another
tool that a patent holder is entitled to use in order to protect and
maintain the exclusionary rights of its patent.' 9 Further, punishing
a patent holder for paying a competitor to remain out of the market
would cut against the grain of what patents are designed
specifically to do; that is, exclude competition during the life of
the patent.20 Lastly, they argued that public policy disfavored the
infringement of patent holders' rights because infringement
"weakens incentives for investing in drug development, which
would reduce the number of life-saving or life-enhancing
innovations that benefit consumers."2 1
D. Process ofIntroducing New and Generic Pharmaceutical
Drugs into the Market
After discussing each party's legal arguments, the court delved
into the issue of how drugs are introduced into the market.22 In
order to sell a new drug in the United States, a manufacturer must
first gain the approval of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).23 A manufacturer seeking to sell a pioneer drug, which has
never been approved by the FDA, must submit a New Drug
Application (NDA).24 The NDA must contain all of the relevant
information about the new drug, "including its chemical
composition, full reports of investigations about its safety and
efficacy, and descriptions of its production, packaging, and
18. Id. at 1301-02.
19. Id. at 1301.
20. Id.
21. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1301.
22. Id. at 1302. See also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
23. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1302.
24. Id.
494
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labeling language."" "An NDA applicant must also provide the
FDA with the patent number and the expiration date of any patent"
that protects the new drug.26 Once the FDA approves an NDA, the
drug, along with its chemical composition and relevant facts, is
published in a book called "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence and Evaluations," commonly known as
the "Orange Book."27
However, if a drug company is applying to the FDA to sell a
generic version of a pioneer drug, the drug company only needs to
file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).28 When a
generic drug manufacturer files an ANDA, it is allowed to
"piggyback" on the safety and efficacy studies performed by the
pioneer drug manufacturer.29 When a drug company files an
ANDA, it must submit one of the following four paragraph
certifications that:
(I) no patent information for the brand name drug
has been filed with the FDA; (II) the patent has
expired; (III) the patent will expire on a specifically
identified date; or (IV) the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the new drug for which the application is
submitted.30
If the generic manufacturer submits an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification, the applicant must send notice to the patent holder
that the patent listed in the Orange Book is either invalid or will
not be infringed by the applicant's generic drug." "The patent
holder then has 45 days to file an infringement lawsuit against the
ANDA applicant," and "[i]f the suit is timely filed, the FDA stays
the ANDA approval process for 30 months to allow the parties or a
25. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (internal quotations omitted)).
26. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (internal quotations omitted)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1302.
30. Id. at 1303 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (internal quotations
omitted)).
31. Id.
2013] 495
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court to resolve the infringement dispute."32 If a court decides that
the patent is invalid or will not be infringed, the FDA's approval of
the ANDA becomes effective on the date that the court enters its
judgment." Federal law encourages ANDA applications by
allowing the first ANDA applicant making a paragraph IV
certification that is approved by the FDA, a 180-day exclusivity
period3 4 during which the FDA will not approve other ANDA
applications." This gives the generic manufacturer a 180-day head
start to compete with the pioneer drug-something the court noted
was "a significant incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge
weak or narrow drug patents." 6
E. Facts
After concluding its statutory analysis, the court reviewed the
specific facts of this case." It discussed the relationship among the
four drug manufacturers and the details of the particular reverse
payment settlement agreements that led to the lawsuit." Besins
Healthcare, S.A., (Besins) developed the prescription drug
AndroGel, a gel that releases synthetic testosterone into a patient's
bloodstream.39 "In August 1995, Besins granted Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [(Solvay)] a license to sell AndroGel in the
United States and agreed to provide a commercial supply of the
drug if the FDA approved it for sale."40 Solvay filed an NDA for
AndroGel in April 1999, which was approved in February 2000,
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) ("Subject to subparagraph (D), if the
application contains a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) and is
for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing
such a certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is
180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including
the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant.").
35. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1303.
36. Id. (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.2d 1294,
1298 (11th Cir. 2003)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1303-06.
39. Id. at 1303-04.
40. Id.
496
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and began marketing and selling the drug with great success.4'
Solvay generated revenue in excess of $1.8 billion dollars from the
sale of AndroGel between 2000 and 2007, revenue that far
exceeded the cost of developing the drug.4 2
Shortly after the FDA approved AndroGel for sale, Solvay filed
a patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) on August 30, 2000.43 The USPTO granted
Solvay's patent application for the drug on January 7, 2003, and
awarded Patent Number 6,503,894 jointly to Solvay and Besins.44
Solvay properly submitted its granted patent information to the
FDA to be included in the Orange Book.4 5 Two drug
manufacturers, Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Watson) and
Paddock Laboratories, Inc. (Paddock), quickly developed generic
versions of AndroGel and submitted ANDAs to the FDA in May
2003.46 Watson was the first to file its ANDA, entitling it to the
180-day exclusivity period, though both companies made
paragraph IV certifications claiming that their generic AndroGel
products did not infringe Solvay's patent or that Solvay's patent
was invalid.47 Solvay timely filed its infringement lawsuit against
Watson and Paddock triggering the 30-month stay of the FDA's
approval process for Watson's and Paddock's generic versions of
AndroGel.4 8 The stay was set to expire in January 2006.49
In order to spread the risks and costs of litigation, Paddock
partnered with Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc. (Par).0 Par
agreed to share the costs of the litigation in exchange for a portion
of the profits from Paddock's generic AndroGel if it were to be
approved by the FDA."' In January 2006, when the 30-month stay
41. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1304.
42. Id.
43. Pharmaceutical Composition & Method for Treating Hypogonadism,
U.S. Patent No. 6,503,894 (filed Aug. 30, 2000) (issued Jan. 7, 2003).
44. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1304.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1304.
51. Id.
4972013]
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elapsed, the FDA approved Watson's and Paddock's ANDA
applications.52 Meanwhile, the parties to the infringement
litigation were awaiting disposition of opposing summary
judgment motions as to the validity of Solvay's patent, which
meant that Solvay was facing the possibility of losing its
monopoly on the AndroGel market." Watson estimated that its
generic AndroGel could cut sales of branded AndroGel by 90%
and cut Solvay's profits by $125 million per year.54 However,
before the district court could rule on the dual motions for
summary judgment, the parties resolved their dispute with multiple
settlement agreements." The terms of the agreements were as
follows: (1) Watson, Par, and Paddock agreed not to sell AndroGel
until August 31, 2015, unless another manufacturer launched a
generic version before then; (2) Watson agreed to promote
AndroGel to urologists; (3) Par agreed to promote it to primary
care doctors; (4) Par "agreed to serve as a backup manufacturer for
branded AndroGel but assigned that part of the agreement to
Paddock"; (5) "Solvay agreed to pay Par/Paddock $10 million per
year for six years and an additional $2 million per year for the
backup manufacturing assistance"; and (6) "Solvay also agreed to
share some of its AndroGel profits with Watson through
September 2015, projecting those payments [to] be between $19
million and $30 million."56
After finalizing the settlement agreements, the four
manufacturers stipulated to a dismissal of the patent infringement
action that was pending in the district court awaiting a ruling on
the dual motions for summary judgment.5 ' After the settlement
agreements were reported to the FTC as required by law," the FTC
filed an antitrust lawsuit against the four manufacturers claiming a
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1305.
55. Id.
56. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305.
57. Id
58. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, 108 Pub. L. No. 173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2462 (§1112 of Federal Trade
Commission Review, discussing the requirements for the notification of
agreements).
498
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violation of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) which banned "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce."" The court reiterated that
the lynchpin of the FTC's complaint was the allegation that
"Solvay was not likely to prevail" in the underlying patent
infringement action, and thus, Watson and Par/Paddock would not
have been barred from entering the AndroGel market by Solvay's
patent.60 The four defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Eleventh Circuit precedent
"immunize[d] reverse payment settlements from antitrust attack
unless a settlement imposes an exclusion greater than that
contained in the patent at issue."" The district court agreed with
the defendants and granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that
the FTC did not allege that the settlements exceeded the scope of
Solvay's patent.6 2 Appealing to the Eleventh Circuit, the FTC
reiterated that Solvay was not likely to prevail in the infringement
actions; thus, the parties should not have been allowed to enter into
the settlement agreements.63
1. Legal Standard ofReview
The Eleventh Circuit began its legal discussion by noting that it
reviews de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).' Since the appeal arose from a dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), all of the factual allegations in the complaint
were accepted as true for the purposes of review.65
59. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1306.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1303.
2013]1 499
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2. Precedential Cases
a. Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit has had several chances to examine the
merits of reverse payment agreements, and it began its analysis
with its seminal case Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.66 In Valley Drug, the court reasoned reverse payment
settlements present an atypical case, specifically because
ownership of a patent means the patent holder has a "lawful right
to exclude others" from the market." Therefore, "the agreements
d[o] not necessarily decrease the level of competition in the
market."" In deciding Valley Drug, the court noted that the
antitrust implications of a reverse payment settlement must be
judged against the "potential exclusionary power" of the patent "as
of the time that the settlement was executed."" The holding in
Valley Drug did not exempt reverse payment agreements from
antitrust scrutiny."o To wit, the court in Valley Drug held "that
parties to a reverse payment settlement should be immune from
antitrust liability if the anticompetitive effects of their settlement
fall 'within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent. ""'
b. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC
After discussing Valley Drug, the court discussed another
precedential case, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.72 In Schering-
Plough, the court reiterated that a patent holder's right to "cripple
competition" made the traditional analysis of an antitrust claim
improper when evaluating a reverse payment agreement." The
66. Id. at 1306 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1294).
67. Id. at 1307.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1309 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311). See
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1309-10.
500
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proper analysis, "requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects."74 This court stated that the "essence" of
the three-prong analysis is an evaluation of whether the settlement
agreements go beyond the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent." In Schering-Plough, the FTC argued that the
defendant "had agreed to pay too much money to settle the case
and that the generic companies had agreed to stay off the market
for too long."76 In rejecting these arguments, the court in
Schering-Plough emphasized that "the general policy of the law is
to favor settlement of litigation."" Further, in light of the cost and
complexity of patent litigation," it should be up to the patent
holder to determine the value of its case.
c. Andrx Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Elan Corp.
Lastly, the court looked to Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan
Corp.7 9 In Andrx, the court ruled that plaintiffs had properly
pleaded an antitrust claim because the generic manufacturer had
agreed to never enter the market for that particular drug." The
generic manufacturer in Andrx was also allowed to retain its 180-
day exclusivity period, despite having no intention to ever market
the drug." Allowing the generic manufacturer in this case to retain
the exclusivity period would have acted like a "cork in a bottle"
because all other generics would have been blocked from the
market.82
74. Id. at 1310 (citing Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1310-11 (internal quotations omitted).
78. Id. at 1311.
79. Id. See Andrx Pharma., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir.
2005).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Other generics would be blocked because the 180-day exclusivity
period does not begin to toll until the first ANDA applicant begins commercial
marketing of the drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). Since the generic in
2013] 501
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3. Discussion of FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals and Affirmation
of the District Court's Ruling
The FTC argued its allegation that Solvay was unlikely to
prevail in an infringement action sufficiently stated an antitrust
claim "because a patent has no exclusionary potential if its holder
is not likely to win the underlying infringement suit."" According
to the FTC, if the patent has no exclusionary potential, then any
reverse payment settlement excludes too much competition from
the market.84 The FTC urged the Eleventh Circuit to adopt "a rule
that an exclusion payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation
objectively as of the time of the settlement, it is more likely than
not that the patent would not have blocked generic entry earlier
than the agreed-upon entry date."" The Eleventh Circuit declined
to re-write its rule and rejected the FTC's argument because such a
rule "equates a likely result ... with an actual result."8 6 The court
held that an antitrust claim cannot be based on the likelihood of a
successful infringement action because "likely" includes the
possibility of a 51% chance one-way, and a 49% chance the other
way." Thus, the court stated, "giving the word its plain meaning,
as many as 49 out of 100 times that an infringement claim is
'likely' to fail, it actually will succeed and keep the competitor out
of the market."" The Eleventh Circuit again repeated that its
"decisions focus on the potential exclusionary effect of the patent,
not the likely exclusionary effect.""
Further, the court noted that parties often settle a lawsuit to
minimize the overall cost of litigation and avoid the possibility of
Andrx never intended to market the drug, the exclusivity period would have
never begun to toll. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311.
83. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (emphasis omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1313 (emphasis added).
502
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losing." The court went so far as to note that when both parties
have a substantial chance of winning or losing, as would be the
case where the probabilities are split 49%-51%, then it is
reasonable for the parties to settle.9' Another reason the court
rejected the FTC's argument was based on the fact that parties will
be more willing to settle a lawsuit when hundreds of millions of
dollars of lost profits are at stake.92 "[E]ven a patentee confident in
the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer a
substantial sum in settlement" if it risked losing millions in
profits.9 3 Further, the chances of succeeding in patent litigation
"rarely exceed seventy percent."94
The court also stated that it did not want to make an "after-the-
fact" calculation about whether a patent holder would have been
likely to succeed if the lawsuit had not been settled." Such after-
the-fact calculations would place a heavy burden upon the parties
and the courts because making these calculations would undo
many of the benefits that a settlement provides, namely avoiding
discovery and litigation costs." Moreover, this retroactive
examination is likely to be unreliable."
The court also rejected the FTC's argument because Congress
has given appellate jurisdiction over patent cases to the Federal
Circuit, and the court felt that it "and the other non-specialized
circuit courts have no expertise or experience in [patent
matters]."9 8 The court felt that it would be ill-equipped to make
judgments about the merits of a patent infringement claim, which
is tantamount to what each appellate court would be forced to do."
Such judgments would be in conflict with Congress' decision to
90. Id. The court made a somewhat humorous analogy when it said, "a party
likely to win might not want to play the odds for the same reason that one likely
to survive a game of Russian Roulette might not want to take a turn." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1313.
96. Id. at 1314.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1314-15.
99. Id at 1315.
2013] 503
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have all appeals involving patent cases decided by the Federal
Circuit.'oo
Lastly, the court rejected the FTC's argument that drug
manufacturers would rather band together to maintain monopoly
profits than compete with each other.'O' In rejecting this argument,
the court reasoned that there are many potential generic
manufacturers that will not be bound by the terms of the reverse
payment agreement, and may challenge drug patents that are
vulnerable.'02 The court mentioned that there is no way the patent
holder will be able to pay every generic manufacturer who makes a
paragraph IV certification in its ANDA application.0 3 The court
closed its opinion by emphasizing that "what the FTC propose[d
was] that we attempt to decide how some other court in some other
case at some other time was likely to have resolved some other
claim if it had been pursued to judgment."'04 The FTC was
essentially asking that a court determine the outcome of a patent
case underlying an antitrust case about the settlement of a patent
case, a task that the court deemed a "turducken" task.'
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
In FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh Circuit
reemphasized its position that a reverse payment settlement is not
contrary to public policy when it does not exceed the potential
exclusionary scope of the patent or patents at issue. Other Circuits
have considered reverse payment agreements, and multiple
opinions have developed as to how these agreements should be
100. Id. at 1315.
101. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315. A turducken is a roast dish consisting of a
boned chicken inside a boned duck, which is then placed inside a partially
boned turkey. Turducken Definiton, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/defmition/english/turducken (last visited Feb. 28,
2013). The court used this metaphor to illustrate the complexity of situation the
FTC was asking the court to undertake when analyzing the reverse payment
settlement agreement. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315.
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judged. Such diversity of opinion has led the Supreme Court to
accept this case for review.' 6 The Supreme Court should adopt a
holding substantially similar to that of the Eleventh Circuit in an
attempt to enhance judicial economy and to protect a
pharmaceutical company's expectation interest. A pharmaceutical
company can rely on this bright-line rule, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the company will re-invest its profits into other life-
saving or life-enhancing research.
A. A Spectrum ofAnalysis Among the Circuits
A variety of positions have developed in the Circuit Courts,
creating a spectrum of analysis regarding reverse payment
agreements. At one end of the spectrum, the Eleventh and Second
Circuits essentially presume validity of these agreements, looking
only to "whether the exclusionary effects of the agreement exceed
the scope of the patent's protection.""' The Third Circuit sits in
the middle of the spectrum and employs a "quick look" rule of
reason analysis based on Congressional statements about the
availability of low cost generic drugs during the passage of the
Hatch-Watchman Act.'"I Finally, at the opposite end of the
spectrum, the Sixth Circuit has gone as far as to say that reverse
payment agreements are per se unlawful as "horizontal market
allocation agreement[s]" in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.'09
Since these drastically different positions on the subject are
irreconcilable, the Supreme Court will have to provide its
guidance. The Supreme Court's trend of late has been to move
106. FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
107. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2012).
109. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir.
2003). The Ninth Circuit has also weighed in, albeit briefly, on the issue of
reverse payment settlement agreements when it upheld, without undergoing its
own analysis, a district court's determination that the agreements are per se
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).
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toward a rule of reason analysis when judging an antitrust claim."o
How the Court chooses to deal with the inherent tension between
competition and the right to exclude competition will be
interesting. Below, this article provides an argument for why the
Supreme Court should adopt a rule substantially similar to the
same rule adopted by the Eleventh Circuit.
B. The Court Should Adopt an Approach Substantially Similar to
the Eleventh Circuit's
The Eleventh Circuit's approach to reverse payment agreements
is well-reasoned and takes into account the realities of patents and
patent litigation. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit offers a bright-
line rule for patentees: agreements that are within the exclusionary
potential of the patent are valid. Given the exclusionary nature of
patents and the complexity of patent and antitrust litigation, the
Supreme Court should adopt an approach substantially similar to
this bright-line rule with a single caveat; the FTC may pursue
litigation if it has actual evidence that the patent holder had
knowledge that its patent was invalid or would be ruled invalid. It
is unclear what type of evidence would be necessary for this
determination because any evidence would have to be present
before the FTC could enter the discovery phase of litigation-
perhaps a statement made in public by a manufacturer's CEO or
President about the potential invalidity of its patent would be
sufficient. While this type of situation would be exceedingly rare,
it would leave open the possibility for the FTC to challenge a
reverse payment settlement agreement.
Bright-line rules as a whole are beneficial because they foster
consistency throughout the courts and because they alert parties to
what is allowed and what is not in the eyes of the law. The
Supreme Court has stated that one of the benefits of a bright-line
rule is that the rule can provide "clear and unequivocal" guidelines
110. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887,
882 (2007); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
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for handling specific situations."' Additionally, the Second
Circuit has noted that one of the benefits of a bright line rule is that
it is "relatively easy for district courts to apply and avoids
protracted litigation and discovery."1 l2 However, a bright line rule
in this instance could allow a brand name manufacturer to unfairly
protect a revenue stream; even if the manufacturer has actual
knowledge of a patent's invalidity.
This small caveat does not remove the substantial benefits that a
bright line rule provides in regard to reverse payment agreements
used to settle patent infringement litigation. Bright line rules are
especially beneficial in the context of pharmaceutical patent
litigation due to the high cost of developing a new, FDA-approved
drug. In its judicial opinion, the Eleventh Circuit began by noting
the high costs that pharmaceutical companies incur when trying to
develop a new drug for the market, citing some statistics that show
that developing a new drug takes between ten and fifteen years and
can cost more than $1.3 billion.113 That $1.3 billion is, however,
only one estimate. Another estimate has large pharmaceutical
companies spending $50 billion per year in collective research and
development in attempting to discover and develop a new drug,
raising the cost for a pharmaceutical company to bring each new
drug to the market to around $1.8 billion.114
The cost that a pharmaceutical company undertakes in
developing a new drug dictates the necessity of applying a bright
line rule to reverse payment settlements. The adoption of this rule
will give a pharmaceutical manufacturer the assurance that its drug
will be protected, at least to the extent that the patent itself
111. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (discussing the benefits
of having a bright line rule in regard to a suspect in custody's request to speak
with counsel before speaking with the police).
112. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 157 (2d
Cir. 2010) (describing the benefits of applying a bright line rule to varying
situations).
113. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1300 (citing Dicket, Orszog & Tyson, supra note 6
at 369, n.10.).
114. Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The
Pharmaceutical Industry's Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS.: DRUG
DISCOVERY 203, 204 (Mar. 2010), available at
(http://www.nature.com/nrd/joumal/v9/n3/pdf/nrd3078.pdf).
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excludes competition. If a pharmaceutical manufacturer has the
assurance that its profit-making drug will continue to be profitable,
the pharmaceutical manufacturer will re-invest its profits into the
research and development of other drugs. These new drugs have
the potential to be unprofitable, costing the manufacturer millions,
if not billions, of dollars in research and development costs.
In this case, the FTC argued that reverse payment settlements
cost consumers about $3.5 billion per year."' However, without
the assurances that a manufacturer would be able to protect its
profits, perhaps the manufacturer would be less likely to re-invest
its money, fearing insolvency if its gold mine patent was ruled
invalid."' The pharmaceutical manufacturers in this case
essentially made this argument when they claimed that the erosion
of patent rights would weaken the incentives for investing in new
drug development."' The FTC also argued that reverse payment
settlements are against public policy because they protect a drug
manufacturer's monopoly rights."' On the contrary, the ruling
protects the public interest because it allows pharmaceutical
manufacturers to re-invest their profits, knowing that their revenue
stream is protected. In the long run, the re-investment of profits
can lead to the further development of other lifesaving drugs.
IV. CONCLUSION
This was a test case for the FTC in which it was trying to get the
Eleventh Circuit to extend its rule for determining the validity of a
reverse payment settlement agreement to include a court's
determination of how the underlying patent infringement lawsuit
would hypothetically be decided."' The Eleventh Circuit decided
not to extend its rule regarding reverse payment settlement
agreements and affirmed its previous rule that a reverse payment
settlement agreement is valid if (1) "its anticompetitive effects fall
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent at
115. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1301-02.
116. Id. at 1302.
117. Id. at 1301.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1312.
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issue" and (2) the determination of the extent of the potential
exclusionary scope of the patent shall be made at the time the
reverse payment settlement agreement was executed.120  The
Eleventh Circuit's opinion is one of a number of differing views
among the Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in this case to unify the analysis relating to reverse
payment agreements. The Court should adopt a position
substantially similar to the Eleventh Circuit's because it provides
the benefit of being attached to a bright line rule. As discussed
above, bright line rules are beneficial generally because they
provide predictability and are easy for district courts to apply to a
variety of situations. Furthermore, bright line rules are especially
beneficial in the pharmaceutical patent context because they allow
a pharmaceutical manufacturer to maximize its profits and re-
invest those profits into the development of new technology.
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